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Abstract 
Biomedical innovation has become riskier, more expensive and more difficult to finance 
with traditional sources such as private and public equity. Here we propose a financial 
structure in which a large number of biomedical programs at various stages of 
development are funded by a single financial entity to substantially reduce the portfolio’s 
risk.  The portfolio entity can finance its activities by issuing debt, a critical advantage 
because a much larger pool of capital is available for investment in debt versus equity.  By 
employing financial engineering techniques such as securitization, it can raise even greater 
amounts of more-patient capital. In a simulation using historical data for new molecular 
entities in oncology from 1990 to 2011, we find that megafunds of $5−15 billion may yield 
average investment returns of 8.9−11.4% for equityholders and 5−8% for 
“research-backed-obligation” holders, which are lower than typical venture-capital hurdle 
rates but attractive to pension funds, insurance companies and other large institutional 
investors. 
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Consensus is growing that the bench-to-bedside process of translating biomedical 
research into effective therapeutics is broken.  A confluence of factors is responsible for 
such pessimism but one of the most widespread is the sense that the current business 
model for life sciences R&D is flawed.1–3 The productivity of big pharmaceutical 
companies—as measured by the number of new molecular entity and biologic license 
applications per dollar of R&D investment—has declined in recent years4, and their 
stock-price performance over the last decade—an annualized return of 1.2% for the New 
York Stock Exchange Arca Pharmaceutical Index during the period from January 2, 2002 to 
January 4, 2012—has been equally disappointing.  Despite the near doubling of the 
aggregate R&D budget of the pharmaceutical industry from $68 billion in 2002 to $127 
billion in 2010, there has been little appreciable impact on the number of new drugs 
approved5. Life sciences venture-capital investments have not fared much better, with an 
average internal rate of return of 1% over the 10-year period from 2001 through 2010 
according to VentureXpert data (Supplementary Empirical Results).    
However, these dismal returns contrast sharply with the many promising 
breakthroughs that have occurred in biomedicine in recent years, including gene therapies 
for previously incurable diseases, molecularly targeted oncology drugs, new modes of 
medical imaging and radiosurgery, biomarkers for drug response or for such diseases as 
prostate cancer and heart disease, and the use of human genome sequencing to find 
treatments for diseases that have confounded conventional medicine, not to mention 
advances in bioinformatics and computing power that have enabled many of these 
applications. Moreover, there are many life-threatening diseases for which the number of 
afflicted individuals continues to increase—if for no other reason than population 
growth—implying a growing demand for therapeutics from a grateful and price-insensitive 
clientele.  Why, then, does the industry appear to be so challenged? 
Here we propose one explanation for this apparent inconsistency and a possible 
solution.  Our proposed explanation is the trend of increasing risk and complexity in the 
biopharma industry.  This trend can be attributed to at least two distinct sources: 
scientific advances and economic circumstances.  The fact that biomedicine is far more 
advanced today than even a decade ago is indisputable, but breakthroughs such as 
molecular biomarkers for certain diseases generate many new potential therapies to be 
investigated, each of which requires years of translational research at a cost of hundreds of 
millions of dollars and has a substantial likelihood of failure.  Although such complexity 
offers new hope to the afflicted, it also presents an enormous number of uncertain 
prospects that must be triaged by researchers, biopharma business executives, investors, 
policymakers, and regulators. 
A host of economic and public-policy conditions has also contributed to this 
uncertainty, including declining real prescription-drug spending; rising drug-development 
costs and shrinking research-and-development budgets; the “patent cliff” of 2012 during 
which several blockbuster patents will expire; increased public-policy and regulatory 
uncertainty after the Vioxx (rofecoxib) debacle; the potential economic consequences of 
healthcare reform; less funding, risk tolerance, and patience among venture capitalists; 
narrow and unpredictable windows of opportunity for conducting successful initial 
public-equity offerings; unprecedented stock-market volatility; and the heightened level of 
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financial uncertainty from ongoing repercussions of the recent financial crisis.  
Consequently, the lengthy process of biomedical innovation is becoming increasingly 
complex, expensive, uncertain, and fraught with conflicting profit-driven and 
non-pecuniary motivations and public-policy implications.  Although other industries 
may share some of these characteristics, it is difficult to find another so heavily burdened 
by all of them. 
This trend of increasing complexity and risk implies that the traditional financing 
vehicles of private and public equity are becoming less effective for funding biopharma 
because the needs and expectations of limited partners and shareholders are becoming less 
aligned with the new realities of biomedical innovation.  The traditional quarterly 
earnings cycle, real-time pricing, and dispersed ownership of public equities imply 
constant scrutiny of corporate performance from many different types of shareholders, all 
pushing senior management toward projects and strategies with clearer and more 
immediate payoffs, and away from more speculative but potentially transformative science 
and translational research.  Private equity may afford more latitude for risk taking and 
deferred exits, but the scale of capital commitment is considerably smaller and funding 
decisions are often driven less by scientific breakthroughs than by business cycles and 
windows for conducting initial public-equity offerings3,6,7. Recent financial research 
suggests that even the mere concern about the availability of future rounds of 
financing—due solely to the  possibility of unfavorable economic conditions—is often 
reason enough for venture capitalists to shun proven and economically viable 
technologies8,9. Industry professionals cite the existence of a “valley of death”—a funding 
gap between basic biomedical research and clinical development.  For example, in 2010 
only $6−7 billion was spent on translational efforts whereas $48 billion was spent on basic 
research and $127 billion was spent on clinical development that same year5,10. 
We propose an alternative for funding biomedical innovation that addresses these 
issues through the use of “financial engineering”11,12, mathematical and statistical models 
for structuring and pricing various financial securities to achieve specific objectives.  Our 
approach involves two components: (1) creating large diversified portfolios—“megafunds” 
on the order of $5−30 billion—of biomedical projects at all stages of development; and (2) 
structuring the financing for these portfolios as combinations of equity and securitized 
debt so as to access much larger sources of investment capital.  These two components 
are inextricably intertwined: diversification within a single entity reduces risk to such an 
extent that the entity can raise assets by issuing both debt and equity, and the much larger 
capacity of debt markets makes this diversification possible for multi-billion-dollar 
portfolios of many expensive and highly risky projects.  One indication of this larger 
capacity is the $1 trillion of straight corporate debt issued in 2011 versus the $41 billion of 
all initial public-equity offerings (excluding closed-end funds) that same year13. 
The need for such large amounts of funding follows directly from the combination of 
the large out-of-pocket costs required to determine the therapeutic potential of a single 
compound from its preclinical stages to either approval or withdrawal, and the number of 
such projects required to achieve a reasonably attractive risk/reward profile for typical 
investors.  The key feature of portfolio diversification is the reduction in uncertainty 
achieved by undertaking many programs simultaneously.  Even though it may be 
impossible to predict which of these programs will succeed or fail, the likelihood of success 
increases with the number of programs undertaken.  This obvious statistical fact has 
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some less-obvious financial implications.  With enough programs in a portfolio, the 
potential revenues become more certain, more easily valued by potential investors, and 
more attractive from a risk/reward perspective.  As a result, these programs are more 
readily packaged for a much larger population of investors via financial-engineering 
techniques such as securitization14, a financing method in which a pool of investment 
capital is raised by issuing equity as well as several classes of bonds that differ from each 
other in their risk-reward profile to a diverse population of investors, and in which the 
funds are used to invest in various assets that serve as the collateral for the bonds.  
Moreover, these assets may be diverse, spanning the full range of preclinical research to 
new drug applications and including royalty interests and licensing agreements as well as 
private and public equity.   
Also, debt financing can be structured to be more “patient” than private or public 
equity by specifying longer maturities; 10- to 20-year maturities are not atypical for 
corporate bonds.  Indeed, in May 2011 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology issued 
$750 million in 100-year bonds at the historically low rate of 5.623%.  Such long horizons 
contrast sharply with the considerably shorter horizons of venture capitalists, and with the 
even shorter quarterly earnings cycle and intra-daily price fluctuations faced by public 
companies.  Through financial engineering, bonds with different maturities can be issued 
by the same megafund to accommodate the different investment horizons of various types 
of investors.  Therefore, a megafund can tailor the investment horizon of its funding to 
suit the programs in its portfolio, enabling research to follow the most scientifically 
productive paths instead of being constrained by financially driven business deadlines. 
These benefits are especially relevant for biopharma research and development, for 
which untimely interruptions due to financial constraints almost always destroy significant 
economic value, even for genuinely effective therapeutics.  Even the possibility of such 
interruptions may be enough to alter important strategic decisions regarding research 
direction in the early stages of drug discovery.  The megafund structure mitigates these 
scientifically perverse (but economically rational) effects, and debt financing still provides 
useful financial discipline and motivation for the borrower because of the need to make 
periodic interest payments.  However, the ability to defer much larger principle payments 
is ideally suited to projects with longer-term payoffs such as those in biomedicine. 
The megafund in context 
Our proposal differs from existing business structures and practices in several 
important ways, and is not equivalent to creating a large venture-capital fund, a new 
pharmaceutical company, or a biopharma mutual fund. 
First, neither the biopharma industry nor their venture-capital investors currently 
use securitization to finance preclinical or early-stage drug development.  Of course, the 
industry has long recognized the benefits of diversification, as demonstrated by the 
increasing number of biopharma mergers, acquisitions, consolidations, and licensing deals 
over the last decade.  Moreover, debt financing has also been embraced.  For example, 
the $46.8-billion acquisition of Genentech (S. San Francisco, CA, USA) by Roche Holdings 
(Basel) in March 2009 was partly financed by Roche’s $16.5-billion bond issue a month 
before; this was the second-largest corporate-bond offering of all time.  However, both 
Roche and Genentech are well-established companies with clear and easily valued revenue 
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streams.  In the current climate of uncertainty, biopharma companies seem more focused 
on reducing risk and increasing operating efficiency—by engaging in mergers, acquisitions, 
licensing deals, and joint ventures to produce more reliable revenue streams—than on 
investing in early stage projects that are even riskier than their existing business lines. 
Second, our proposal is to create a single financial entity that invests in multiple 
biomedical projects at various stages of their development cycle financed by securitized 
debt and equity, not to create another large publicly traded pharmaceutical company.  
Although big pharma companies are central to the later stages of drug development and the 
marketing and distribution of approved drugs, they do not currently play as active a role at 
the riskier preclinical and early stages of development for the reasons described above.  
Megafunds can fill this gap by funding more speculative early-stage R&D in exchange for a 
percentage of future royalties or proceeds from any subsequent sale of the intellectual 
property.  Such speculative investments require a much broader set of assets to achieve 
sufficient risk reduction, which is precisely what a megafund is designed to do.   
Also, at earlier stages of development, the required resources per project are 
smaller, and the ability to change direction by discontinuing less promising projects and 
redeploying capital to more productive assets is considerably easier.  Compared with the 
plethora of small pharmaceutical companies currently pursuing just one or two projects, 
these savings are especially significant for a megafund.  It is considerably harder to cull 
compounds efficiently in a small company because the livelihoods of the employees and 
management depend on the continued development of the company’s few compounds—in 
these cases, development tends to continue until the money runs out.  With a megafund, 
this conflict is greatly reduced—capital can be more efficiently allocated to projects that 
are likely to succeed, and failing projects and compounds can be abandoned rapidly.  In 
fact, for megafunds that have invested in a sufficient number of early-stage projects, it may 
be worthwhile to build and operate shared facilities for conducting preclinical studies 
motivated by the megafund’s projects.  Such a “preclinical incubator” could provide the 
megafund with valuable economies of scale as well as reducing duplicative costs in the 
industry. 
Third, our proposed megafund is not a biopharma mutual fund, which is simply a 
pooled vehicle for equity investors and therefore restricted to investing in companies that 
are already publicly traded.  A megafund may invest in such companies, but it can also 
invest in startups, existing private companies, royalty streams, intellectual property, and 
other assets.  Moreover, a megafund will issue both debt and equity, making its capital 
structure materially different from that of a mutual fund; the business pressures, priorities, 
and horizons it faces are correspondingly different.  A megafund’s portfolio manager is 
likely to be much more actively engaged in the scientific and engineering aspects of the 
portfolio assets, not unlike a traditional venture capitalist; in contrast, a biopharma mutual 
fund manager is essentially a stock-picker whose only involvement in the management of 
the portfolio companies is through proxy voting decisions. 
Despite these differences, a megafund does bear some resemblance to an existing 
class of business entities in the biopharma industry—drug-royalty investment 
companies—and this similarity supports the basic premise of our portfolio approach to 
financing biomedical innovation.  Companies like Royalty Pharma (New York), Cowen 
Healthcare (Stamford, CT, USA), and DRI Capital (Toronto) are investment vehicles that 
acquire ownership interests in the royalty streams of approved drugs, rather than the 
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equity of biopharma companies.  By combining these ownership interests into a single 
portfolio, these vehicles are able to provide more attractive risk/reward profiles for their 
investors and can issue debt to finance their acquisitions.  For example, the largest of the 
drug-royalty investment companies is Royalty Pharma, which owns interests in over 30 
approved and marketed products—including such blockbusters as Humira (adalimumab), 
Remicade (infliximab), Atripla/Truvada (emtricitabine, tenofir), Januvia (sitagliptin), and 
Rituxan (rituximab)—and interests in five products in late-stage clinical trials and/or 
under review at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  It has assets of over $8 
billion as of May 2012, of which $4.1 billion is securitized debt with the acquired royalty 
streams of approved drugs serving as collateral.  Its most recent debt issue occurred on 
May 24, 2012, a successful offering of $600 million maturing on November 9, 2018 and 
priced at 98.5 with a borrowing spread of London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 
3.00%—excellent terms considering current market conditions.  All three rating agencies 
have rated this new issue “investment grade”, an important designation that makes this 
debt eligible for purchase under the investment policies of many institutional investors 
such as pension funds, endowments, and foundations.  From 2004 to 2011, Royalty 
Pharma made $5.8 billion in life sciences investments, a notable amount in comparison to 
the entire life-sciences venture capital industry’s investment of $26.3 billion during the 
same period. 
The key difference between Royalty Pharma and our proposed megafund is the 
investment mandate. Royalty Pharma invests only in revenue-producing intellectual 
property (that is, royalty interests in FDA-approved products and in product candidates in 
late-stage clinical development (phase III), not in preclinical or early stage projects).  As 
the investment focus shifts to earlier parts of the drug-approval process, the uncertainty 
becomes greater, calling for larger portfolios and more sophisticated financing and 
risk-management techniques to generate the same level of diversification and risk 
reduction.  This inverted financing pyramid in which the biggest portfolios correspond to 
the earliest stages of translational medicine underscores the value of the megafund vehicle. 
The feasibility of a megafund 
Our proposal is clearly motivated by financial innovations that also played a role in 
the recent financial crisis; hence it is natural to question the wisdom of this approach.  A 
full accounting of the causes of the financial crisis has yet to be written, and many mutually 
contradictory narratives have emerged and are still being developed15. Nevertheless, 
several unambiguous lessons can be learned from the crisis that are relevant to our current 
context.  Although there is no consensus yet as to the ultimate causes of the crisis, there is 
little doubt that securitization was, and continues to be, an effective means of raising 
capital.  Indeed, it may have been too effective15,16, allowing potential homeowners to tap 
directly into a much larger pool of capital instead of obtaining mortgages from traditional 
banking institutions.  But several other factors also contributed to the unprecedented 
amount of mortgage-related debt issued and the subsequent housing boom and bust17: a 
low-yield environment that motivated investors to take on additional risk to capture higher 
returns; the positive trend in U.S. residential real-estate values over the four decades prior 
to the peak of the housing market in 2006 and the widely held belief that it would persist; 
competition among commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial institutions to 
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diversify their revenue streams by entering new businesses such as mortgage-lending and 
structured financing; financial incentives for all parties involved in the securitization 
process; regulatory forbearance and accounting practices that obscured financial losses 
and did not adequately prepare for financial-market dislocation; and politicians who 
advanced the “ownership society” initiative through legislation and government agencies 
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). 
These factors offer important practical insights into the feasibility of creating 
biomedical megafunds.  For example, one insight is the important role that government 
guarantees played in supporting the housing market: it is must less costly to provide a 
guarantee that protects bondholders than to purchase the bonds outright16. Therefore, the 
impact of public funds such as those allocated to the National Center for Advancing 
Translational Sciences can be greatly multiplied by using them to provide guarantees of 
debt-financed private entities engaged in translational medicine rather than investing in 
those entities directly (Supplementary Methods: Credit Enhancement). 
Even so, the analogy between megafunds and the mortgage companies of the 
financial crisis also points to some potential pitfalls to be avoided.  Statistical models of 
the biomedical portfolio returns should be based on a detailed understanding of the science 
and engineering underlying the individual projects in addition to an analysis of historical 
returns.  Portfolio valuations should reflect current market realities at all times rather 
than hypothetical expectations, otherwise sharp declines and panic selling may be easily 
triggered when the market’s valuation differs significantly from the portfolio manager’s.  
And regulations surrounding the sale of megafund securities—including proper risk 
disclosure by issuers, suitability requirements for investors, and realistic credit 
analysis—should be strictly enforced.  Securitization is a powerful tool for raising capital, 
but like most powerful technologies, it can be abused when proper controls are not 
imposed.   
From a broader perspective, the recent financial crisis is by no means unique18, and 
bubbles and crashes may be an unavoidable consequence of human behavior coupled with 
free enterprise.  Innovation may inevitably lead to irrational exuberance and 
unsustainable over-investment, as with Dutch tulip bulbs in the 1630s, biotech stocks in 
the 1980s, internet stocks in the 1990s, and U.S. residential real estate in the early 2000s.  
Perhaps the most effective remedy may be to recognize the potential for speculation to 
emerge in any industry, and to ensure that those investors who are ill-suited to such 
boom/bust cycles do not become victims of their destructive forces.  More positively, if 
speculative behavior is a fact of economic life, it may be worthwhile to redirect some of this 
energy toward social priorities such as reducing the burden of disease. 
Nevertheless, throwing money blindly into an underperforming industry is hardly a 
recipe for success, as several industry experts have acknowledged3,19,20. Apart from the 
concerns related to the financial crisis, there are substantial organizational challenges to 
deploying large amounts of capital in the biopharma industry even if megafund financing is 
feasible.  For example, operational complexities of managing a portfolio of highly 
heterogeneous biomedical projects also increase with scale, which can reduce some of the 
benefits of diversification.  Many venture capitalists have learned the hard way that small 
is beautiful, and that beyond a certain level of assets under management, their investment 
opportunity set begins to suffer from adverse selection, attracting more mediocre 
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opportunities and fewer genuine breakthrough companies.  A recent study found that the 
internal rates of return of venture capital funds peaked somewhere between $100 and 
$250 million, and declined when assets exceeded $500 million21. This finding may seem to 
cast doubt on the wisdom of megafunds.  However, as discussed below, megafunds are 
designed to appeal to a different set of investors.  Therefore, the return objectives for 
megafunds do not have to reach the lofty level of historical venture-capital returns because 
the risk of these investments is commensurately lower. Nevertheless, potential 
dis-economies of scale must be carefully weighed in determining the optimal size of a 
megafund, which is likely to differ from one application to the next and should be 
determined by balancing organizational complexity against scientific, operational, and 
financial synergies. 
New business models as well as novel approaches to management, corporate 
governance, and scientific collaboration may also be necessary before significantly larger 
amounts of capital can be profitably deployed in this industry.  Although these important 
issues lie beyond the scope of this paper, in the Discussion section below we provide a brief 
review of several of the most significant business challenges to megafund financing as well 
as some possible solutions.  As outsiders to the biopharma industry, we note that many of 
these implementation issues are beyond our expertise, but based on discussions with a 
broad cross-section of industry experts, we believe that megafund financing merits further 
consideration.  The analysis in the sections to follow suggests that if these 
implementation issues can be addressed, the financing techniques proposed here can 
greatly expand the current scale of biomedical innovation. 
For those who are unfamiliar with financial portfolio theory, we present a highly 
simplified mathematical model in the next section that provides intuition for our approach 
in an unrealistic but accessible context.  We then describe the mechanics of financial 
securitization—the creation of new securities that are claims on a portfolio of real assets 
such as biomedical research—after which we present the main results of our paper: a more 
realistic multi-period simulation of the financial performance of a cancer megafund based 
on historical oncology drug-development databases with over 700 compounds in various 
stages of preclinical and clinical development from 1990 to 2011.  We conclude with a 
discussion of the potential impact of megafunds on various biopharma stakeholders, some 
practical challenges of implementation, and possible solutions. 
Portfolio theory 
 Consider a hypothetical drug-development program requiring $200 million in 
out-of-pocket costs over a 10-year period during which no revenues are generated, and 
with only a 5% probability of success (thus, the total cost of developing a single successful 
drug is considerably higher).  Few investors outside the biopharma sector would be 
tempted by such an opportunity, even though the expected rate of return on this 
investment may be quite attractive.  In fact, if such a drug were a blockbuster (which is 
consistent with the assumed 5% success rate), it is plausible to assume that it could 
generate net income of $2 billion per year over a 10-year period of exclusivity from years 
11−20.  The present value of this income stream in year 10 is $12.3 billion (using a 10% 
cost of capital22), implying an expected compound annual rate of return of 
11.9% = (0.05$12.3/$0.2)1/10  1  over the 10-year investment period (Figure 1).  
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However, investors do not earn 11.9% with certainty, but face two possible outcomes 
instead: a 95% probability of earning 100% and a 5% probability of earning 
51.0% = ($12.3/$0.2)1/10  1.  These projects may simply be too risky for most investors 
given the near certainty of getting wiped out and the long wait before any revenues are 
generated. 
Now consider investing in 150 such programs simultaneously through a single 
investment vehicle with 150$200 million = $30 billion of investable capital, which we 
shall refer to as a “megafund”.  For simplicity, assume that the success or failure of each 
program is a statistically independent draw.  Then the probability of at least one success 
among 150 independent programs is 99.95% = 1  0.95150, which is quite a different 
proposition.  Although the expected profit of each of the 150 programs remains the same 
at $12.3 billion, the likelihood of at least one hit is dramatically increased, reducing the risk 
of the entire portfolio.  One simple measure of this risk reduction is the standard 
deviation of the annualized return, which is 423% for an individual draw, but only
150423%/=34.6%  for the annualized portfolio return.  The more risky and less 
correlated the underlying assets are, the greater the benefits to pooling them, not unlike an 
insurance pool that provides protection for each of its participants by spreading any given 
individual’s losses over the entire membership.  Such pools become more effective as the 
number of participants increases, and the same is true for megafunds of drug-development 
projects. 
This risk reduction is not costless, but comes at the expense of a much greater 
capital commitment.  Also, unless the individual assets in a portfolio are mutually 
uncorrelated (which is exceedingly improbable), modern portfolio theory23 shows that 
there is a limit to the amount of risk that can be eliminated through diversification.  This 
limit and the optimal size of the megafund depend on several factors including the pairwise 
correlations between the assets’ returns, the natural scale of the investment in each asset, 
and the risk appetite, expected-return requirements, and investable wealth of the 
population of potential investors.  Although some investors may prefer the 
high-risk/high-return profile of a one-shot drug-development program, there seems to be a 
much larger pool of investors who prefer the lower-risk/lower-return profile of a portfolio 
of programs, as suggested by the relative sizes of the venture capital industry ($176 billion) 
and the mutual fund industry ($11.8 trillion)24. 
Although this example is a caricature of the drug-development process and employs 
a blockbuster drug metaphor for expositional simplicity (see Supplementary Analytics 
for a nonblockbuster version), it does illustrate one of the key benefits of the megafund 
structure: the risk reduction from diversification would allow the megafund to issue large 
amounts of debt as well as equity, greatly broadening the pool of potential investors willing 
to fund such projects.   
To see why, suppose each of the 150 projects was undertaken by a separate 
company, yielding 150 companies with development costs of $200 million apiece.  The 
all-or-nothing nature of each company’s payoff implies that even if a company issued only a 
small amount of debt, the default probability of such bonds would be 95%.  With default 
nearly guaranteed, debt financing is virtually impossible for these single-project entities, 
and the riskiness of a single project implies that an initial public-equity offering is also 
unlikely. 
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However, a single entity with 150 such programs could issue $24.6 billion of 
zero-coupon bonds—bonds that pay only one lump-sum payment at maturity—maturing 
in year 10 with a default probability of only 0.4% (the probability of less than two 
successes because two hits yield a present value of 2$12.3 = $24.6 billion in year 10, just 
enough to pay off the bondholders).  This default probability is comparable to the 
historical realized 10-year default rates of the highest-rated category of debt (Aaa) from 
1920 to 2010, according to the bond-rating agency Moody’s25.  As of February 2012, 
Moody’s reported the average yield of seasoned Aaa corporate bonds with ~30 years to 
maturity to be 3.85%,26 which is a reasonable proxy for the yield of a 10-year bond with 
identical credit quality.  At a yield of 3.85%, a zero-coupon bond that promises to pay 
$24.6 billion in year 10 would generate proceeds of $16.8 billion when issued in year 0.  If 
the remaining $13.2 billion were financed by equity, the expected rate of return and 
standard deviation would be 21.5% and 78.9%, respectively.  These values are higher 
than those of an all-equity-financed case (11.9% and 34.6%) because of leverage, but are 
still within the range of risk/reward profiles of publicly traded equities.  A megafund’s 
ability to issue both debt and equity with attractive terms to a larger pool of potential 
investors provides greater scale and diversification benefits, yielding greater risk reduction 
and bigger overall impact on biomedical innovation.  Of course, the degree of risk 
reduction depends entirely on the number of assets in the portfolio and the pairwise 
correlations of the individual projects’ financial returns, which we have assumed to be zero 
for expositional convenience.  Greater correlation reduces the benefits of diversification, 
and the extreme case of perfect correlation implies no benefits at all.  In our simulation 
study of an oncology megafund described below, we assume pairwise correlations of 20%. 
The lower-risk/lower-return profile of a megafund may have little appeal to venture 
capitalists—especially when compared to an investment in a single compound—but is 
likely to be of much greater interest to pension funds, insurance companies, money market 
funds, banks, and other large financial institutions, who control a vastly larger pool of 
investment capital.  For example, at the end of 2010 the California Public Employees 
Retirement System held $226 billion of investable assets, the Norwegian government 
pension fund held $537 billion, and nongovernment U.S. institutional money market funds 
held $1.1 trillion.  Moreover, as of the end of 2010, the total size of the U.S.  bond 
market was $35.2 trillion.  In relation to these magnitudes, a megafund of $30 billion no 
longer seems as unattainable if debt-financing is feasible. 
Of course, the required size of a megafund is determined by many factors as we 
show in our simulation study below, and although our simple portfolio example adopts the 
standard blockbuster revenue model, neither that analysis nor the simulation results hinge 
on discovering blockbusters (Supplementary Analytics).  This is especially important in 
light of recent challenges to the blockbuster revenue model from changes in patent laws, 
payer reimbursement policies, and the discovery of biomarkers that reduce the population 
of patients for certain drugs20,27.  Portfolio theory applies to any level of drug 
development, and its effectiveness is determined by the combination of expected revenues, 
probability of success, and correlations among drug-development programs, not by the 
scale of the portfolio’s assets. 
We have grossly oversimplified the economics of the biopharma industry in the 
above example to provide intuition for the mechanism by which investment performance 
can be enhanced through diversification.  The main results of this paper consist of a 
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detailed multi-period simulation of an oncology megafund that reflects more realistic 
features of the drug-development process, including correlation among assets, stochastic 
transitions from one phase to the next over time, and realistic valuations of compounds 
that are sold during intermediate stages of the clinical trials process.  Before turning to 
these results, we first address the challenge of raising large amounts of capital, which may 
seem impractical given recent corporate consolidations, budget cutbacks, and capital 
scarcity28.  This challenge can be met via the second component of our framework: 
securitization. 
Securitization 
 Given the scale of financing needed for creating a truly diversified portfolio of 
drug-development investments and the time lag between capital commitment and return, 
private-partnership structures, such as venture capital, may not be the best source of 
funding for this industry.  Instead, we propose tapping public capital markets directly 
through securitization14, a common financing method in which investment capital is 
obtained from a diverse investor population by issuing debt and equity securities that are 
claims on a portfolio of assets—in our case, biomedical research.  A common form of 
securitization involves “cash flow” transactions in which a portfolio of assets—typically 
mortgages, auto loans, student loans, or credit-card receivables—is acquired using money 
raised by issuing equity and bonds of different seniorities.  These assets and the cash flow 
they generate are pledged as collateral for the debt.   
In our proposed application, the assets include the initial capital raised from 
investors, all the subsequent biomedical R&D and licenses acquired, and all the profits 
generated by these activities or through sales of these assets in later periods.  The 
application of securitization to early-stage clinical and preclinical biomedical has not been 
described previously, and we shall refer to debt that is collateralized by such assets as 
‘research-backed obligations’. 
To ensure that the portfolio of assets is used only to satisfy the payments of the 
newly issued research-backed obligations, the megafund forms a a stand-alone legal entity 
called a ‘special purpose vehicle’ for the express purpose of purchasing the collateral and 
issuing and servicing the securities.  Equity holders own equity in the special-purpose 
vehicle and thus have a claim on the residual assets and cash flow that remain after all debt 
obligations have been satisfied.  The special-purpose vehicle is managed by a separate 
management company, but for simplicity we shall refer to both the special-purpose vehicle 
and the management comapany that structures the biomedical R&D acquisitions and 
licensing deals as the megafund. 
To provide different levels of risk and expected return for the broadest possible set 
of potential investors, the megafund divides research-backed obligations into distinct 
classes or “tranches” with different repayment priorities.  The senior tranche has highest 
priority, meaning that in each payment period its obligations must be satisfied first before 
those of any other tranche, and each of the more junior tranches are repaid in order of their 
priority.  In the event that the assets do not generate sufficient cash flow to make all 
promised payments to bondholders in any given period, the senior-most tranche will be 
paid first, followed by the next most senior tranche and so forth, until the available cash is 
exhausted.  Therefore, the senior tranche is the least likely to experience losses; thus, it 
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will have the lowest risk and offer the lowest yield, which appeals to the most risk-sensitive 
investors such as money market funds, banks, and smaller pension funds.   
More junior tranches have higher loss probabilities and must offer correspondingly 
higher yields to compensate investors for this increased risk, which attracts more 
risk-tolerant investors such as large pension funds, endowments, and high-net-worth 
private investors.  The most junior tranche is often structured as equity—and sometimes 
called the “equity tranche”—with no promised payments whatsoever but with unlimited 
upside potential once bondholders are repaid in full.   
Equity holders stand to reap the biggest gains if the megafund’s underlying assets 
do well, but they are the first to suffer losses if those assets are not profitable.  As a result, 
this is the riskiest tranche and is likely to be purchased by the most risk-tolerant portion of 
the investor population (that is, hedge funds, funds of funds, and deep-pocketed 
institutional investors including large endowments and pharmaceutical companies).  The 
size and order of the tranches is known as the special-purpose vehicle’s “capital structure” 
and the motivation for multiple tranches should now be clear: regardless of how 
risk-averse or risk-seeking an investor is, there is likely to be a particular tranche of this 
special-purpose vehicle’s debt issue that will satisfy the investor’s risk preferences. 
In addition to the different levels of priority, research-backed obligations can be 
customized in several important ways.  For example, they can be structured to have 
varying maturities ranging from short term (to appeal to more impatient investors like 
commercial banks and money market funds) to long term (to appeal to pension funds, 
endowments, and sovereign wealth funds).  By providing the desired maturity for each 
type of lender, research-backed obligations may appeal to a broader cross-section of 
investors while reducing the shorter-term pressures of generating earnings and preparing 
for an initial public-equity offering, which can often lead to the distressed sale of promising 
but early-stage assets.  Typical securitizations employ debt maturities of 15 years or less; 
for example, in August 2007 DRI Capital (Toronto) issued $356 million of 8- and 15-year 
bonds backed by major royalty rights to the FDA-approved biopharmaceutical products 
Enbrel (etanercept), Remicade, PREOS (preotact), and FluMist (trivalent live attenuated 
influenza vaccine). 
Additional features known as “credit enhancements” and “triggers” are often used to 
provide further protection for the research-backed obligations’ most senior tranches.  
These features include default insurance through credit-default swaps, 
over-collateralization, the use of interest- and debt-coverage ratio thresholds that trigger 
accelerated payments when breached, and government guarantees and tax incentives 
(Supplementary Methods: Credit Enhancement). 
The special-purpose vehicle’s capital structure, priority of payments, and various 
coverage tests and credit enhancements are collectively known as the “cash flow 
waterfall”—a reference to the manner in which the cash flow from the special-purpose 
vehicle’s assets spills over from senior to junior tranches—which fully determines the 
financial structure of each of its corresponding securities and how investors will be 
compensated in all circumstances (Figure 2).   
Once the special-purpose vehicle’s cash flow waterfall is specified, the economic 
value of the securities it issues can be directly related to the performance of its assets.  If 
the statistical properties of the cash flow of each of those assets can be quantified, the 
risk/reward profile of the special-purpose vehicle can be estimated, its securities can 
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potentially be rated by bond-rating agencies, and these securities can be evaluated and 
purchased by a broad universe of investors.  Therefore, one of the key factors in 
determining whether a pool of assets can be securitized is whether the stochastic 
properties of the underlying assets’ returns over time can be measured and managed.  In 
the multi-trillion-dollar mortgage-backed securities market, the answer was (and still is) 
yes, as is the case for corporate debt and several other asset classes29.  We believe the 
same may be true for biomedical research.  By creating a large portfolio of 
well-diversified biopharma investments and by spreading the risks and rewards of such a 
portfolio across a much larger and more diverse group of investors through securitization, 
it may be possible to facilitate large-scale and long-term biomedical innovation in a 
sustainable and, ultimately, profitable manner. 
A cancer megafund as an illustrative example 
 To illustrate the practicality of megafund financing, we present a detailed 
simulation of a hypothetical funding vehicle for cancer drug-development programs.  Our 
focus on cancer is motivated by three considerations.  First, cancer is a leading cause of 
death.  The lifetime probability of developing cancer in the U.S. is 1 in 2 for men and 1 in 3 
for women30, and the number of deaths caused by cancer worldwide will grow to over 12 
million per year by 203031, creating an urgency and visibility that will greatly facilitate 
fundraising for a cancer megafund.  Second, because cancer is a complex group of over 
200 diseases, the multiple approaches to anticancer therapies yield greater opportunities 
for portfolio diversification, offsetting to some degree the megafund’s singular focus on 
cancer.  And finally, several comprehensive databases of cancer drug-development 
programs exist, allowing us to construct more realistic simulations of the possible risks and 
returns from a cancer megafund.  These simulations are critical for capturing the 
complexities of the oncology drug development process and communicating the 
megafund’s risks and rewards to potential investors, a prerequisite of any succcessful 
fundraising effort. 
These motivations must be tempered by the caveat that a megafund devoted solely 
to cancer is likely to understate the benefits of diversification and megafund financing for 
at least two reasons: the unavoidable correlation among cancer drug discovery programs 
due to common biochemical pathways and pathologies, and the fact that since 2004 
cancer-drug approval rates have been the lowest among all therapeutic areas (6.7% in 
oncology versus 12.1% in all other areas combined as of 201132).  A more effective 
approach would be to target many diseases in addition to cancer so as to increase 
diversification.  Moreover, our simulation focuses exclusively on the development of 
anticancer compounds, which ignores several other important facets of cancer care, such as 
diagnostic tools, radiosurgery, and gene therapy, for which we have much less historical 
data to draw on.   
As with any simulation, each of our parameters can be challenged as being too 
conservative or too optimistic, and our hypothetical business structure may be viewed as 
too simplistic.  We acknowledge these concerns at the outset and encourage readers to 
experiment with our simulation software using their own calibrations (our complete 
sourcecode is available in both R and Matlab under an open-source license that enables all 
researchers to use, modify, and distribute it). 
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For concreteness, the financing mechanism we consider in this illustration relies on 
the securitization of experimental drug compounds only, and the objective of the 
special-purpose vehicle would be to finance the development of each of its compounds 
while satisfying the megafund’s obligations to its bondholders and providing attractive 
returns to its equity investors.  The business structure of the special-purpose vehicle is 
illustrated in Figure 3, and the types of payments made by the special-purpose vehicle 
during its life include the following. 
  
1. Start-Up Expenses and Purchases.  The special-purpose vehicle will deploy its 
initial capital by acquiring economic rights to anticancer compounds in exchange for 
upfront and milestone payments as well as funding R&D and clinical trials (see 
Supplementary Methods: The Drug Approval Process for a summary of the 
clinical trials process). 
2. Initial Post-Launch Expenses and Principal and Interest.  Because it may take 
several years before its investments begin generating revenues, the special-purpose 
vehicle will set aside an initial cash reserve to fund clinical trials for its portfolio of 
compounds during the life of the transaction.  These reserves will also ensure that 
timely payments of interest can be made on the research-backed obligations. 
3. Ongoing R&D and Financing Expenses.  The special-purpose vehicle will pay for 
ongoing R&D expenses of its portfolio assets during the life of the megafund.  As 
part of this process, the special-purpose vehicle may decide to sell some of its assets 
and engage in other corporate transactions to realize gains, meet funding needs, or 
for strategic reasons. 
4. Management Costs.  During each year, the special-purpose vehicle will pay 
salaries to its staff, fees to external service providers, and other operating costs that 
are part of the management fee, which is typically assessed as a fixed percentage of 
the special-purpose vehicle’s total assets under management. 
5. Sale of Portfolio.  Upon the maturity of the longest-dated research-backed 
obligation, the special-purpose vehicle portfolio will be liquidated and the proceeds 
paid out to the equity holders.   
Our analysis involves simulating the revenues and costs in each period during the 
life of the special-purpose vehicle as compounds advance through the R&D and approval 
process.  We use historical industry values that are summarized in Table 1 and derived 
from various research studies and data from financial information and news provider 
Bloomberg (New York)4,33–35.  To calibrate the simulation of the clinical-trials process, we 
merged two data sets: the DEVELOPMENT optimizerTM database provided by Deloitte 
Recap (San Francisco) and a data set provided by the Center for the Study of Drug 
Development at Tufts University School of Medicine (Medford, MA, USA).  The merged 
data contained over 2,000 compounds that, after removing duplicates and compounds for 
which there was not enough information, yielded a final set of 733 new molecular entities 
developed primarily for anticancer indications that entered clinical trials between January 
1990 and January 2011.  These compounds were developed by biotech or pharmaceutical 
companies and were either therapeutic compounds or vaccines (summary statistics for the 
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data are provided in Supplementary Methods: Simulations).  Using these data and the 
results of Paul et al.4, we define seven distinct phases of drug development—the initial 
preclinical phase, the three stages of the clinical-trials process (Phases I, II, and III), new 
drug application, approval, and withdrawal—and estimate the transition probability matrix 
P given in Table 2 using standard statistical methods (Supplementary Methods: 
Simulations). 
Using this transition matrix and assumptions regarding the revenues, costs, and 
correlations of the drug-development process—summarized in Tables 1 and 3—we 
perform two simulations labeled “Simulation A” and “Simulation B” (Figure 4).  Both 
simulate a series of six-month periods during which compounds are either withdrawn, 
sold, or advance to the next clinical stage depending on whether or not they achieve 
various milestones.  Simulation A corresponds to early-stage investments in compounds 
that begin in the preclinical phase which—if they are not sold for other reasons 
earlier—are sold when they transition to Phase II.  Simulation B corresponds to 
later-stage investments in which compounds are acquired in Phase II and sold when they 
are FDA-approved.  This division acknowledges the major scientific and business 
differences between early-stage investments, which are typically the domain of venture 
capitalists, and later-stage development typically undertaken by large biotech or pharma 
companies that license compounds predeveloped by smaller biotech companies and 
finance their development until discontinuation or approval by the FDA.  By conducting 
two separate simulations, we are implicitly allowing different sets of investors to 
participate during different phases of the drug-development process.  This structure 
permits the maturities of the bonds to be much shorter than would be the case if 
compounds were funded by the same investors throughout the full cycle from preclinical 
development to FDA approval, which can often exceed a decade.  Full-cycle simulations 
can also be performed within our framework.  Taken together, the two simulation 
experiments performed in this paper provide a compelling case for megafund financing 
throughout the entire drug-development cycle. 
The simulation experiments are done in pairs, each pair consisting of a traditional 
all-equity fund—similar to a venture capitalist or mutual fund—versus a matching 
research-backed-obligation structure with a senior tranche, a junior tranche, and an equity 
tranche, where the size of the equity investment is the same in both (we use three tranches 
only for expositional simplicity; in practice, more tranches could be offered).  Unlike the 
simplified example above in which we assumed that the cash flow from each 
drug-development program in the portfolio was uncorrelated, our simulations impose a 
more realistic 20% positive correlation between the valuations of all pairs of compounds to 
capture the potential for the clustering of negative outcomes in any given period 
(Supplementary Methods: Simulations). 
Table 4 contains the results of a megafund with $5 billion of initial capital invested 
over 7.5 years in a target portfolio of 100 preclinical and 100 Phase-I compounds, with a 
$1.25-billion senior tranche, a $1.25-billion junior tranche, and a $2.5-billion equity 
tranche, implying a modest leverage ratio of 2-to-1 for the special-purpose vehicle.  In a 
simulation consisting of 500,000 independent sample paths, an average of 102 compounds 
reached the goal of entering Phase II.  As, historically, there is a very small but nonzero 
probability of transitioning from Phase II to Phase III in less than one semester (e.g., due to 
concurrent trials), the transition matrix P allowed for this possibility and the simulations 
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generated a small number of compounds that reached Phase III, new drug application, and 
approval before the end of the life of the fund. 
The results in Table 4 show that the megafund is almost always profitable.  The 
senior-tranche research-backed obligation investors received an annual coupon payment 
of 5% and were repaid in full 99.9% of the time, which is comparable to historical default 
rates of the highest-rated bonds according to Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s25,36, the two 
largest bond-rating agencies in the financial industry.  Junior-tranche research-backed 
obligation investors were paid an annual coupon payment of 8% and repaid in full 99.1% 
of the time.  Finally, equity-tranche investors received an average annual return of 8.9%, 
and in over a third of the simulated sample paths their average annual return exceeded 
15%.  While such returns may not be sufficiently attractive to traditional venture 
capitalist investors, large institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance 
companies, and endowments are likely to show more interest.  Recall that unlike 
venture-capital funds and all-equity structures where the possibility of substantial or total 
loss can be nontrivial, the megafund structure offers both debt and equity—risk-seeking 
investors can purchase the latter and more conservative investors can participate through 
the former.  Because there are substantially larger pools of conservative investment 
capital, research-backed obligations allow the biopharma industry to greatly expand its 
drug-development efforts by tapping into this tremendous asset base.  In fact, certain 
types of financial institutions may find research-backed obligations especially attractive 
either because they serve as natural hedges to existing business risks, such as annuity 
providers (whose costs increase when people live longer), or because their corporate 
mandate is to support socially relevant activities but precludes them from investing in 
equity (in which case they can now invest a portion of their endowment’s assets in 
research-backed obligations rather than just awarding grants from the annual interest on 
those assets). 
The higher risk of the equity tranche is accompanied by the benefits of leverage 
provided by the bond issue, which allows the special-purpose vehicle to invest in a larger 
and more diversified portfolio of assets.  This effect can be quantified by comparing the 
results of the equity-and-debt case with the all-equity simulation, in which the 
special-purpose vehicle contains the same amount of equity capital ($2.5 billion) but no 
debt (Table 4).  In the all-equity simulation, the megafund invests in 50 preclinical and 50 
Phase-I drugs, successfully carrying 52 to Phase II and generating an expected annualized 
return of 7.2%.  The fact that this is lower than the 8.9% return in the research-backed 
obligations case is explained by the correspondingly lower risk of the less-leveraged 
portfolio (note that the probability of a negative return is 17% in the all-equity case and 
20% in the research-backed obligations case). 
In simulation B, compounds are acquired in Phase II and each can transition to its 
next development phase, be discontinued, or be sold.  Any compounds that are approved 
for the market are automatically sold.  Table 4 presents the results of 500,000 
independent simulated sample paths of a megafund with $15 billion of initial capital 
invested over 7.5 years in a target portfolio of 100 Phase-II compounds.  The capital 
structure consists of a $6-billion senior tranche (with 5% yield as in simulation A), a 
$3-billion junior tranche (with 8% yield), and a $6-billion equity tranche, implying a 
2.5-to-1 leverage ratio.  On average, the simulation yielded just under 8 compounds 
approved for sale and over 21 compounds advanced to Phase III or new drug application 
Fernandez, Stein, Lo 7 September 2012 Page 17 of 31 
(because they did not have time during the life of the fund to reach market approval or 
were sold to finance principal and interest payments to bondholders).  The investment 
performance of this special-purpose vehicle is even more attractive than the early-stage 
simulation.  Senior-tranche research-backed obligation investors were repaid in full 
99.9% of the time, junior-tranche investors were repaid in full 99.4% of the time, and 
equity-tranche investors received an average annual return of 11.4%, which compares 
favorably with the results offered by the equity-only fund.  In fact, an equity-only fund 
with the same equity capital ($6 billion) would finance the development of 40 Phase-II 
drugs, with only six advancing to Phase III or new drug application, five to market, and 
offering investors an expected annualized return of only 7.2%. 
Will rates of return of 8.9−11.4% for equity and 5−8% for debt attract capital of 
$5−15 billion as we have assumed in these simulations? The answer depends on the type of 
investor.  Such returns may be of little interest to the private-equity and venture capital 
community, but for more conservative and larger institutional investors such as pension 
funds, insurance companies, money market and mutual funds, endowments, foundations, 
and trusts, these returns may be more compelling.  To see why, consider the fact that the 
median rates of investment return of public pension fund assets over the 5-, 10-, 20-, and 
25-year periods ending December 31, 2011 were 2.0%, 5.7%, 7.7%, and 8.3% 
respectively37.  Moreover, in a July 2012 survey of 126 state and local government 
pension funds, the median target investment return was 8.0%37.  This number represents 
more than just a survey response—it is incorporated as an actuarial assumption that 
affects a pension fund’s investment and pension-benefit decisions; hence a target return of 
8.0% is a relevant hurdle rate for such institutions, which account for $3 trillion in 
investable assets as of the first quarter of 201237.  Of course, institutional investment 
decisions also depend on other characteristics besides return potential such as risk and 
correlation to broadly diversified stock and bond portfolios (which are the vast majority of 
these institutions’ holdings).  These considerations are precisely the motivation for 
offering multiple tranches, each with a different risk/reward profile.  One of the primary 
advantages of securitization over more traditional methods is the ability to customize 
financing arrangements to suit the particular characteristics of the assets and investors 
(e.g., more tranches, staggered debt maturities, permanent equity, and payments that are 
contingent upon reaching certain research milestones).  Greater customization implies a 
broader population of investors for which these customized securities may be appropriate 
investments. 
Of course, our simulation results depend on our choice of simulation parameters, 
which represents just one of many possible sets of assumptions.  To allow readers to 
evaluate the feasibility of megafund finance under their own preferred scenarios, we have 
placed our simulation software in the public domain with an open-source license to run, 
modify, and distribute the code (Supplementary Software). 
Discussion 
 Despite the promising simulation results for oncology compounds, any 
implementation of megafund financing must overcome several practical challenges. In this 
section we provide a brief summary of these challenges and some possible solutions (for a 
more detailed discussion, see Supplementary Discussion). 
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The challenges of implementing megafund financing can be loosely grouped into 
two broad categories: raising capital and deploying capital.  The feasibility of raising 
billions of dollars for biomedical applications is predicated on the ability of investors to 
assess the risk/reward trade-offs of the investments.  Historical biopharma data may not 
be an accurate guide to the future because of the rapidly shifting landscape of translational 
medical research and its economic implications for the industry.  However, the inability 
to accurately predict translational research outcomes does not imply an inability of 
investors to assess the financial risks of and commit capital to a diversified portfolio of such 
outcomes.  The changing nature of biomedical innovation can be complemented by 
changing the nature of the corresponding funding vehicles—greater risk, even unknown 
risk, can often be managed effectively through more sophisticated financial engineering. 
A less obvious but equally important concern is that megafund financing works too 
well.  In addition to their potentially attractive risk/reward profiles, biomedical 
megafunds are naturally positioned to benefit from the “socially responsible investing” 
trend in the financial industry.  This growing trend is a powerful force that could quickly 
turn a niche product into a cottage industry.  The rapid growth and subsequent crash of 
the U.S. mortgage-backed securities markets has provided us with a number of important 
lessons for managing this potential boom/bust pattern.  Rules regarding sales practices, 
disclosure requirements, permissible corporate governance structures, and suitability 
criteria for investors must be imposed and strictly enforced to ensure that megafunds 
serve their purpose without jeopardizing the stability of the financial system. 
Deploying megafund capital is likely to pose a greater challenge than raising capital, 
especially if capital is raised quickly.  There are at least four elements to this challenge 
that require further investigation.  The first is whether academia and the biopharma 
industry have sufficient physical and intellectual capacity to make use of megafund capital.  
The second is whether the market for compounds, licenses, and royalties will become 
sufficiently deep and liquid to generate enough cash flow to service megafund debt.  The 
third is whether any single organization can successfully manage the complexity of a 
megafund portfolio.  And the fourth is whether the political and regulatory 
environment—including healthcare reform and the FDA approval process—will support 
the kind of innovation implied by megafund financing. 
We believe that all four of these challenges can be met.   
With respect to capacity, based on published research as well as informal 
discussions with academic and industry insiders, it is clear that there are more innovative 
ideas, graduate students, and professionals in biomedical research than there is funding to 
support them.   
With respect to the secondary market for biopharma projects, the recent experience 
of the mortgage-backed securities industry suggests that market depth and liquidity are 
highly correlated with asset growth; if tens of billions of dollars flow into biomedical 
megafunds, that alone is likely to enhance secondary market activity substantially.   
With respect to the organizational complexities of megafund management, as 
financial economists and biopharma-industry outsiders, we are not qualified to judge the 
feasibility of this endeavor.  Even so, the fact that the leading drug-royalty investment 
company, Royalty Pharma, manages $8 billion in assets with a full-time staff of only 19 
professionals (albeit with the support of a much larger network of biomedical experts as 
consultants) suggests that managing a $30 billion megafund is not impossible.  Moreover, 
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size confers benefits as well as costs, including economies of scale and scope, research 
synergies, greater stability, staying power, and marketing clout.   
Finally, with respect to the political and regulatory environment, given the current 
climate of political deadlock, a concerted effort by the private sector to reduce the burden 
of disease may be one of the few initiatives capable of generating truly bipartisan support.  
In the same way that other markets have benefited from various forms of government 
support, a biomedical megafund should be at least as attractive a cause for ambitious 
politicians to adopt. 
One final challenge facing the megafund that involves neither raising nor deploying 
assets has to do with the inherent conflict between the business culture and the world of 
science and medicine2.  This conflict is not new to megafunds, but has existed since the 
very beginning of the biotech industry.  However, the sheer size of a megafund may 
magnify these conflicts to an unsustainable level.   
The combination of social relevance and the profit motive may seem confusing and 
inappropriate to some, but this trend is becoming more prevalent as we face societal 
challenges that require an unprecedented scale of collaboration among millions of 
individuals.  Although charitable giving is an important part of translational medical 
research, the magnitude of such giving is dwarfed by the pool of investment capital seeking 
a reasonable rate of return.  By creating financial incentives for solving social problems 
like cancer, society is able to tap into this much larger pool of assets.   
The megafund can be viewed as another example of the broader trend toward 
“venture philanthropy” as practiced by existing organizations such as the Gates Foundation 
(http://gatesfoundation.org), the Robin Hood Foundation (http://robinhood.org), and the 
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (http://ciff.org). Another form of this trend is 
public-private investment programs, in which private-sector institutions provide financing 
under certain types of government sponsorship.  Such programs played an important role 
in dealing with the recent financial crisis by raising over $29 billion of investment capital to 
purchase distressed securities38.  Several important government initiatives are already 
underway for speeding up translational medical research such as the U.S.  government’s 
National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (which is part of the Cures 
Acceleration Network) and the Israeli Life Sciences Fund.  But with budgets of only $575 
and $200 million, respectively, these efforts will eventually also require substantial 
private-sector funding—megafunds may be one solution. 
Conclusion 
Cancer is just one of a growing number of large-scale challenges confronting 
modern society that can only be addressed through the sustained collaboration of 
thousands of highly skilled, dedicated, and independent individuals over many years.  
Financial engineering methods such as portfolio theory and securitization facilitate such 
complex collaborations by providing appropriate financial incentives to all stakeholders.  
Although altruism and charitable giving are important elements in responding to these 
challenges, we cannot rely solely on these motivations given the scale of the problems to be 
solved.  By structuring biomedical research funding in a research-backed obligation 
format, incentives to reduce the burden of disease are distributed to a much broader 
community of stakeholders.  As a result, much greater resources can be marshalled to 
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take on such challenges which, in turn, will attract leading experts to join the effort, 
instilling even more confidence among investors, and so on.  Such a virtuous cycle can 
greatly magnify a megafund’s likelihood of success. 
Our proposed application of securitization may be untested, but the techniques are 
used extensively in the financial industry.  Some of these uses involve mortgage-related 
securities that played a central role in the recent financial crisis, which has created a 
backlash of skepticism and distrust among certain investors and issuers.  However, 
rather than shying away from such techniques because of the crisis, a more measured 
response may be to acknowledge their strengths, address their weaknesses, and use them 
wisely to meet the most pressing social challenges.  Despite the lack of consensus 
regarding the ultimate causes of the financial crisis, its magnitude provides compelling 
evidence that with the proper incentives and financial structure, securitization is a highly 
effective means of gathering large amounts of capital in a relatively short period of time.  
If used responsibly, these tools could play a transformative role in many other socially 
important initiatives. 
Proposing to raise billions of dollars for biomedical research in the current 
economic climate may seem ill-timed and naïve.  However, today’s low-interest-rate 
environment is, in fact, ideal for issuing long-term debt, and investors around the globe are 
desperately seeking new investment opportunities that are less correlated with traditional 
asset classes.  More importantly, the cost in terms of burden of disease—as measured by 
the more than half a million people expected to die of cancer this year in the United States 
alone or the $263 billion in estimated economic impact30—must be balanced against the 
risk of failure.  Similar trade-offs exist for other grand challenges of this century such as 
flu pandemics, climate change, and the energy crisis.  Instead of asking whether we can 
afford to invest billions more at this time, perhaps we should be asking whether we can 
afford to wait. 
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Parameter Preclinical Phase I Phase II Phase III NDA Approved 
       
Compound Valuation Assumptions ($millions) 
Mean 16 30 82 425 1,515 1,870 
Max 100 250 500 1,000 2,500 5,000 
Lognormal Mean 2.4 3.0 4.0 5.8 7.4 7.2 
Lognormal SD 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Pairwise Correlation 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 

      
Investment Assumptions ($millions) 
Upfront   2.5 7.5 20.1 75.2 
 
 Milestone  1.3 3.8 10.0 37.6 
 
 
      
 Development Cost Assumptions ($millions) 
Mean expected cost 6 19 50 188 
 
 SD cost/phase 6 16 47 132 
 
 Max cost/phase 20 50 120 500 
 
 Lognormal Mean 1.5 2.7 3.7 5.1 
 
 Lognormal SD 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 
              
         
  
Table 1: Summary of valuation and cost assumptions for the biomedical megafund 
simulation.  The means and standard deviations of the lognormal distribution of costs 
and valuations were calibrated based on published studies and public databases; details 
are provided in Supplementary Methods: Simulations. 
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PreCt+1  
Phase 
It+1   
Phase 
IIt+1  
Phase 
IIIt+1  
NDAt+1       APPt+1      WDt+1     
PreCt  50.0       34.5       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       15.5       
Phase It   0.0       80.8       13.3       0.5       0.0       0.0       5.3       
Phase IIt  0.0       0.0       84.5       6.7       0.3       0.1       8.5       
Phase IIIt  0.0       0.0       0.0       84.8       6.8       2.1       6.3       
NDAt       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       56.7       41.2       2.2       
APPt      0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       100.0       0.0       
WDt     0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       0.0       100.0       
 
 
Table 2: Transition probability matrix (in percent) for simulating the clinical trial process 
from preclinical (PreC) to Phases I to III to new drug application (NDA), approval (APP), or 
withdrawal (WD).  Time subscript t indicates current six-month simulation period and 
t+1 indicates the following six-month simulation period. Entries in each row may not sum 
to 100% due to rounding.  Details are provided in Supplementary Methods: 
Simulations. 
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  Parameter Assumed Value in Simulation 
  
Time: 
 Tenor of the research-backed 
  obligation 7.5 years (15 semesters) 
Time to deploy capital 1 semester 
Time to sell each compound 2 semesters 
  Capital Structure: 
 Total amount of capital $2.5−15 billion 
Tranches Senior bond, junior bond, equity 
Leverage 2 or 2.5 times 
Bond annual yield Senior bond 5%, junior bond 8% 
Redemption senior bond Equal semiannual installments from semester 5 to 8 
Redemption junior bond Equal semiannual installments from semester 9 to 12 
Cash out equity Period 17 
  Investor Protection Rules: 
 Interest coverage test Senior debt (2), junior debt (3 or 3.5) 
Cash reserved at start To cover for 2 periods of interest and expected drug development costs 
  Other: 
 Number of compounds per fund Between 40 and 200 
Equity ownership of each asset 85% 
Research-backed obligation 
   service fee 0.5% per year of total assets under management 
Return on excess cash  1% per year 
    
   
 
Table 3: Additional parameters of the biomedical megafund simulation (see 
Supplementary Methods: Simulations for details). 
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Variable or Summary Statistic 
Simulation A   Simulation B 
All-Equity 
Research- 
Backed 
Obligations 
  All-Equity 
Research- 
Backed 
Obligations 
      Number of Compounds      
Preclinical 50 100  — — 
Phase I 50 100  — — 
Phase II — —  40 100 
Phase III — —  — — 
      
Research Impact      
Number of compounds to reach Phase II 52.8 101.7  — — 
Number of compounds sold in Phase III and NDA 0.9 2.3  6.0 21.3 
Number of compounds sold once APP 0.6 1.0  5.1 7.6 
      
Liabilities      
Capital ($ million) 2,500 5,000  6,000 15,000 
Senior Tranche ($ million) — 1,250  — 6,000 
Junior Tranche ($ million) — 1,250  — 3,000 
Equity Tranche ($ million) 2,500 2,500  6,000 6,000 
            
      
Equity Tranche Performance      
Average annualized return on equity 7.2% 8.9%  7.2% 11.4% 
Prob. ( return on equity < 0 ) 17% 20%  17% 10% 
Prob. ( return on equity > 5% ) 61% 68%  63% 79% 
Prob. ( return on equity > 15% )  15% 35%  14% 40% 
      
Debt Tranches Performance  
  
 
 Senior Tranche: default prob., expected loss (bp) —  1 , < 1  —  6 , < 1 
Junior Tranche: default prob., expected loss (bp) —  87 , 27  —  60 , 30 
            
      
  
  
Table 4: Performance summary statistics of the biomedical megafund simulations.  bp 
denotes units of basis points or 0.01%; prob. denotes probability. 
    
  
 
 
   
Figure 1: Timeline of cash flow for simplified example of a typical drug-development program in which out-of-pocket costs 
with present value of $200 million at date 0  generate annual net income of $2 billion in years 11 through 20, implying a 
present value of $12.3 billion at date 10  (based on a 10% cost of capital). APP, approval; B, billion. 
0 10 11 20 12 
$2B $2B $2B … 
 
$12.3B 
Present Value of Profits 
$200MM Phase I  II  III  APP 
Year 
Total Cost 
    
 
 
   
  
Figure 2: Schematic of the waterfall of cash flow for a typical research-backed obligation 
securitization. 
    
  
Fernandez, Stein, Lo 7 September 2012 Page 31 of 31 
   
Figure 3: Business structure of a biomedical megafund special-purpose vehicle.  Funds 
are raised from retail or institutional investors (1) through the capital markets issuance (2) 
of various types of debt and equity.  These funds are invested in molecules being 
developed to cure cancer (3).  Some funds are reserved to pay for later clinical 
development costs and, if required, to cover the first few periods of coupon payments.  
The portfolio of drugs is developed over time (4).  At any time a compound can be 
discontinued, move to the next phase or even two phases ahead based on the results of the 
trials done.  It is also possible that compounds are sold prior to their Food and Drug 
Administration approval for marketing if it is necessary to monetize them to cover some of 
the fund interest or principal payments.  Any compound that is approved for marketing 
as a new drug is sold to a biopharma company.  At the end of the life of the fund, all 
remaining compounds in the portfolio are sold (5).  After bondholders are paid back (6), 
the residual cash is used to pay back the equityholders (7). 
 
    
 
 
  
 
Figure 4: Simulating two distinct business stages of a biomedical megafund. 
   
